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I. INTRODUCTION
While the world watched transfixed as Eastern Europe transformed into
independent democratic nations, an equally brilliant metamorphosis was
occurring in Latin America. Latin America has long endured a volatile, and
sometimes violent, political environment; many of these countries have
histories replete with governmental destabilization and military coups. Peru
has undergone over one hundred revolts, including forty-five military coups.'
Forty-five of that country's seventy-three leaders have been military leaders.2
Twelve different constitutions and twelve magna cartas governed the country
before civilian rule was finally reinstated in 1979.3
Both Argentina and Paraguay suffered through harsh military dictatorships.
Beginning in 1976, a military dictatorship took over the Argentine government
and left up to thirty thousand people dead before losing power.' In 1954,
Paraguay's military began its thirty-five-year control over the country. Several
hundred people lost their lives, and thousands were imprisoned.
While avoiding bloodshed, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia also had military
takeovers. During Brazil's military regime, in power between 1964-1985, only
two hundred deaths were reported; however, many Brazilians fled the country
seeking refuge abroad.6 During Uruguay's dictatorship of 1973-1985, torture
J.D. 2000, University of Georgia.
In fact, Peru has been able to sustain formal democratic rule only twice- between 1895-
1914 and between 1980-1992. Civilian rulers have been in power only around thirty-four
percent of the time since Peru became an independent country. This is one of the worst records
in Latin American. See David Scott Palmer, Democracy in Peru?, in ASSESSING DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA 243 (Philip Kelly ed., 1998).
2 See Diario de los Debates (visited Dec. 16, 1999) <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/index.
htm>, search (Buscar) for Diario de los Debates; result page 'Diario de los Debates 27/08/98
Sesi6n Nro 5 Sesi6n del Pleno'.
' See Philip Mauceri, The Transition to "Democracy" and the Failures of Institution
Building, in THE PERUVIAN LABYRINTH: POLITY, SOCIETY, ECONOMY 13, 29-30 (Maxwell A.
Cameron & Philip Mauceri eds., 1997).
4 See The Challenge of the Past, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 1998, at 34.
' See id.
6 See id.
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was widespread. In Bolivia, during a four-year period, seven military
governments and two powerless civilian governments ruled the country.7
The 1980s, however, introduced a time of widespread democratization in
Latin America.! During this decade, all of these countries (as well as Chile)
replaced military rule with democratically elected leaders.9 Although
democracy finally appears to be taking root and blossoming, doubts linger over
the permanence of democracy in this region of the world.' ° Ironically, the
actions of a democratically elected leaders of Latin America cast the greatest
doubt on the stability of their democracies." This paper will analyze the
stability of democracy in Latin America by examining the following four
areas: the stability of the democratically elected civilian government, the
stability of constitutional rule, the stability of free elections, and the stability
of the judiciary. 2 This paper seeks to explore these four areas while taking
into account the current social and political situation in Latin America. This
paper will give special attention to Peru, as that country poignantly evinces the
regional conflict between democracy and authoritarianism.
II. THE STABILITY OF DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENTS
The increased political disturbance in the 1990s undermines the democratic
stability achieved in the previous decade. In the 1990s, escalating coup
attempts disrupted democratically elected governments throughout Latin
7 See Eduardo A. Gamarra, Facing the Twenty-First Century, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA 71, 72 (Kurt von Mettenheim & James Malloy eds., 1998). These
governments were in power between the years 1978 and 1982. See id.
' See Deborah L. Norden, Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela: From
Subordination to Insurrection, LATIN AM. RES. REV., Jan. 1, 1998, at 143. Cuba, of course,
presents a notable exception to the general trend of democratization. However, some believe
that eventually Cuba will also have a democratic government. See Damian J. Fernandez,
Passion and Democracy in Cuba, in ASSESSING DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 1,
at 158.
9 See The Challenge of the Past, supra note 4, at 34.
'0 See Kurt von Mettenheim & James Malloy, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA,
supra note 7, at I.
See The Challenge of the Past, supra note 4, at 34.
12 Political science professor Russell Fitzgibbons of UCLA identified these factors as
important in measuring democratic growth in Latin America. See Phillip Kelly, Measuring
Democracy in Latin America: The Fitzgibbon Index, in ASSESSING DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA, supra note 1, at 3.
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America. The first coup attempt occurred in Haiti on September 30, 1991.13
Only seven months after Haiti's first-ever freely held elections, the military
deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Although the international
community immediately leveled economic sanctions against Haiti's new
military government, it took three years of economic pressure, along with
United States' military intervention, to finally restore Aristide to power. 4
Several months after the Haitian coup, on February 4, 1992, a military coup
directed by junior military leaders threatened Venezuela's government.' The
worsening economic and social conditions as well as rampant corruption in the
president's administration angered the military. 6 The revolting officers
claimed to support democracy, contending that they would strengthen
democracy by removing the corrupt president and his cabinet.' 7 Although the
government quickly quashed the coup attempt, widespread demonstrations in
support of the coup leaders evidenced the general discontent with the
democratic regime. While favoring democracy, many Venezuelans expressed
anger at government corruption and expressed their belief that the military
could reform the corrupt democratic government.'
Almost two months later, another coup disrupted the region's stability.
Peru's democratically elected president, Alberto Fujimori, announced an
autogolpe or self-coup, making himself the sole leader of the country.'
9
Fujimori dissolved Congress, put some members under house arrest,
suspended the 1979 Constitution, and limited freedom of the press.2° While
Fujimori promised periodical referendums on important issues, he refrained
from announcing any plans to hold free elections.2'
." See Arturo Valenzuela, The Crisis of Presidentialism in Latin America, in POLITICS,
SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY: LATIN AMERICA 121, 131 (Scott Mainwaring & Arturo Valenzuela
eds., 1998).
14 See id. at 132.
IS See Norden, supra note 8, at 153.
16 See id. at 155.
17 See id.
IS See id.
,9 Political writers give many reasons for this coup including the need for emergency
powers to combat the deadly terrorist group Shining Path and to fight against the "institutional
gridlock" resulting from the numerous political parties. This analysis, however, exceeds the
scope of this paper. See Maxwell A. Cameron, Political and Economic Origins of Regime
Change in Peru: The Eighteenth Brumaire ofAlberto Fujimori, in THE PERUVIAN LABYRINTH:
POLITY, SOCIETY, ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 35, 52, 54.
20 See Carol Graham, Introduction: Democracy in Crisis and the International Response,
in PERU IN CRISIS: DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY? 1, 5 (Joseph S. Tulchin & Gary Bland eds.,
1994).
23 See id. at9.
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Fujimori's coup met with overwhelming approval from Peruvians and
overwhelming disapproval from the international community. Polls conducted
in Peru soon after the coup reflected that upwards of eighty percent of the
population approved of the coup.2 2 Business leaders, as well as the population
as a whole, agreed that strong measures were necessary to effectively control
the crime, terrorism, and corruption enveloping the country.23
The international community, including many of Peru's Latin American
neighbors, viewed the situation as an attack on democracy not only in Peru but
also in the region as a whole. President Menem of Argentina shared his
concerns about the coup in a lengthy conversation with then President Bush,
w{hile the Uruguayan foreign minister immediately scheduled a fact finding
mission to Peru.24 The Organization of American States (OAS) called for
Fujimori to establish a timetable for democratic elections. The OAS while
condemning the coup did not call for economic sanctions.25
Probably more persuasive than the rhetoric of foreign ministers and OAS
officials, the threat of economic sanctions caused Fujimori to reconsider his
position. The United States and Japan cut off all but humanitarian aid.26 A
recovery package including 1.4 billion dollars in loans from developed
countries threatened to fall apart, and over two hundred million dollars were
withdrawn from Peruvian banks after the April 5th coup.27 While the
international community did register strong disapproval of Fujimori's acts,
some powerful countries hinted that Fujimori simply needed to restore
democracy without necessarily restoring the status quo before the coup. 28 One
senior State Department official from the United States noted that Peru just
needed to "get that democratic feeling back.,
29
In a May meeting before the OAS, Fujimori grudgingly agreed to hold
elections. 30 However, elections could not magically restore democracy in
Peru. In fact, these elections strengthened rather than weakened Fujimori's
grip on power. The elections were held without any assurances of impartiality
22 See MAXWELL A. CAMERON, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN PERU: POLITICAL
COALITIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 145 (1994).
23 See id.
24 See id. at 154.
21 See id. at 155.
26 See Graham, supra note 20, at 7-8.
2 See Bending, Maybe: Peru, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992, at 44.
2S See CAMERON, supra note 22, at 155.
29 Id.
30 See Bending, Maybe: Peru, supra note 27, at 44.
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by the government.3 Peruvians' disapproval of both Congress and the many
political parties led to voter apathy and the highest levels of absenteeism
(voting is compulsory in Peru) and blank votes in thirty years.32 Minority
parties split between participating in the elections and boycotting the elections
in protest over Fujimori's autocratic acts. The two largest opposition parties,
APRA and Acci6n Popular, refused to endorse any candidates, claiming this
was an illegal election for an illegal Congress.33 As a result of the disarray in
the opposition's ranks, Fujimori's supporters won a majority in the new
Congress.34
Although the opposition could not prove mass electoral fraud, these
elections manifested a "gross imbalance" in media access and coverage.35
Candidates backed by Fujimori were given practically free access to prime
time television coverage while opposition members were denied coverage. 6
Rather than investigate the allegations of unfairness and fraud, the interna-
tional community simply endorsed the elections and proclaimed democracy
restored in Peru.37 The OAS supervision of the elections gave legitimacy to
the process and to the belief that Fujimori supported democracy. In the end,
Fujimori accomplished his goal-his supporters gained an absolute majority
in the new eighty-member Congress.3
Following Fujimori's successful coup, the military in five other Latin
American countries attempted takeovers. After the years of relative govern-
mental stability in the region, the four successive coup attempts occurring
quickly after Fujimori's coup suggest the influence of Fujimori on other
leaders in Latin America.
A scarce six months later, on November 27, 1992, the Venezuelan military
attempted another coup. 9 While the leaders of the last coup consisted mostly
of junior officers, high ranking navy and air force officials carried out this
3' See Fernando Rospigliosi, Democracy's Bleak Prospect, in PERU IN CRISIS: DICTATOR-
SHIP OR DEMOCRACY?, supra note 20, at 35, 46.
32 See id. at 47.
11 Peru Gives Its Verdict, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 43.
34 See Rospigliosi, supra note 3 1, at 47.
" Francisco Sagasti & Max Hernandez, The Crisis of Governance, in PERU IN CRISIS:
DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY?, supra note 20, at 23, 27.
36 See id.
37 See Rospigliosi, supra note 3 1, at 49.
" See Peru Gives Its Verdict, supra note 33, at 33. This new Congress replaced a two
hundred forty member Congress. Id.
31 See Weary and Wary, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 54.
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latest attempt. Loyal government troops quickly contained the coup attempt,
albeit after violent confrontations.'
The coup attempt in Guatemala on May 25, 1993, held uncanny similarities
to Fujimori's autogolpe. Like Fujimori, the president of Guatemala dissolved
Congress, shut down the Supreme Court, invoked emergency powers to run the
country, and called for the election of a new Congress to rewrite the constitu-
tion.4' However, unlike Fujimori, President Serrano faced a defiant Congress
and Supreme Court that refused to be relieved from their power. Further, the
international community responded more harshly. The United States cut off
all aid, and the OAS began working on a plan to implement economic
sanctions, a step not taken by the OAS against Peru."2 The Guatemalan
military quickly withdrew its support for the ill-fated coup. By week's end the
autogolpe had failed, and the president was deposed.43
In Brazil, an autogolpe was suggested although never attempted. The
military encouraged President Franco to consider an autogolpe modeled after
Fujimori's. 44 Although Brazil confronted many of the same problems as Peru
(notably "institutional gridlock"), Brazil's president, a firm believer in
democracy and, perhaps more importantly, lacking adequate political support,
declined to take this measure to help reform the government.45
In April of 1996, Paraguay was threatened by a coup attempt. Then
President Wasmosy relieved army commander General Lino Oviedo of his
post.46 However, General Oviedo had no intention of gracefully leaving the
army but instead threatened to topple the government. The deposed general,
along with five thousand troops, set up in barracks on the outskirts of the
capital city, Asunci6n, and demanded a position in the defense ministry.
Although President Wasmosy had the support of Congress, the Paraguayan
people, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and the United States, he initially gave
into Oviedo's demands and offered him the coveted job.47 However, this
capitulation was soon followed by a withdrawal of the president's offer, and
Oviedo backed down from his attempts to destabilize the government.48
40 See Norden, supra note 8, at 143.
41 See Cameron, supra note 22, at 169.
42 See id.
41 See id.
4 See id. at 171.
41 See id. at 172-74.
46 See Paraguay: Backward March, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at 47.
41 See id.
41 See The General Loses, ECONOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 40.
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Most recently, in January 2000, Ecuador's democratically elected president,
Mr. Mahuad, was deposed by a coup, which included members of the armed
forces as well as indigenous farmers.4 9 The army and the farmers were
disgruntled with the continuing economic crisis and the devaluation of the
currency. 3 After only a few hours, however, the army pulled its support for
the coup, probably in part due to pressure exerted on it by the United States.5
Although Mr. Mahuad was not restored to power, his vice-president took
control and restored civilian rule.52
These many coup attempts seem to offer a discouraging outlook on the
continuing vitality of democracy in Latin America. However, while countries
enjoying long histories of democratic and stable rule tend to view coups as
"traumatic event[s] for the nation," many Latin American societies view coups
as legitimate ways of replacing the ineffective incumbent regime." Some
writers have suggested that viewing coups as great national tragedies is
imposing the "Anglo-Saxon, democratic views onto other societies" and that
in reality coups are "not quite the body blow to society that an observer from
America or Western Europe might assume [them] to be."' 4 Rather, the coup
is viewed simply as an alternative to elections-elections many times tinged
with political unrest and corruption.5 5 As noted above, while governments
around the world condemned the coups in Peru and Venezuela, the people of
those countries supported the coups as ways to rid the countries of corrupt and
ineffective leadership.
Further, many of the coups were immediate or eventual failures, and the
democratically elected leaders retained power or were later restored to power.
Only Peruvian President Fujimori conducted a successful coup, and today
many of the safeguards of democracy, such as free elections and a freely
elected Congress, have been restored in Peru. Although the situation appears
grim at first glance, the many coup attempts in the last few years do not
necessarily indicate that democracy cannot survive in Latin America.
49 See A Warning From Ecuador, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 23.
'0 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
5' BRUCE W. FARCAU, THE Coup: TACTICS IN THE SEIZURE OF POWER 6 (1994).
54 Id. at 6-7.
" See id. at 6.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
III. THE STABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
While the impact of military coups may be hard to determine, the continued
disregard for constitutional rule by democratically elected leaders does
threaten some fundamental democratic freedoms because political stability is
many times closely linked to the actions of the elected leaders. "Electoral
fraud, official corruption [and] the unconstitutional extension of a president's
term" may all serve the immediate purposes of the government and may even
serve to temporarily prolong a democratic government.5 6  However, the
democratic government then loses its moral authority, and it "deprives the
regime of the moral right to denounce the military when it, in turn, acts outside
of the law, ostensibly in defense of higher national interests. ' 7 For this
reason, it is essential to the stability of a country to identify the actions of
leaders that deprive the people of constitutional rights and that, in turn, can
lead to unrest in military ranks.
Since returning to democratic rule, many Latin American countries, wary
of one-man dictatorships,"8 have adopted new constitutions that include
restrictions on reelection. 9 Some leaders, though, aspiring to more years in
office, have attempted to change their country's constitution to allow
consecutive reelections.
A. Panamanian and Brazilian Presidents Attempt to Change the Constitution
In Panama, President Ernesto Perez Balladeras proposed a constitutional
amendment that would allow him to run for another term in 1999 and serve
five more years.60 Panamanians had to approve the amendment in a nation-
wide referendum. President Balladeras spared no expense as he campaigned
in favor of the amendment and touted the common line that another term in
office was necessary to implement his reform package.6' Much to the
56 Id. at 35.
57 Id.
s8 See Two Terms and You're Out: All Latin American Countries Ban or Limit the Re-
election of Incumbents, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1998, at 16.
59 The countries of Costa Rica, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Guatemala, and
Honduras do not allow reelection. Venezuela and Panama allow reelection after ten year
intervals. Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay allow reelection after
one term of being out of office. Argentina, Brazil, and Peru allow for one successive term. See
Re-election Bid Is Now Formally on: Opinion Polls Still Show a Large Majority Opposed,
LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Nov. 11, 1997.
60 See Panama: No Second Term, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 32.
61 See id.
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president's dismay, Panamanian voters overwhelmingly opposed the
constitutional amendment.62
Unlike the Panamanian president, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso was able to convince the Brazilian Congress to amend the constitu-
tion. The Brazilian Constitution requires sixty percent of congressional
support before any constitutional change can be made.63 Although pro-
Cardoso members of Congress easily had the votes necessary to secure this
change, many of these members were reluctant to hand over any more power
to the executive branch." Ultimately, President Cardoso was able to persuade
the members of Congress to support his proposition for reelection.65
The actions of these two presidents did not undermine stability in their
respective countries because they used legitimate means to change the
constitution. Further, the Panamanian president accepted the outcome of the
referendum without question. Leaders in other Latin American countries,
however, were not as concerned with using legitimate means to achieve their
goals.
B. Argentina's President Attempts to Reinterpret the Constitution
Argentina's President Carlos Menem also hoped for another term in office
even in the face of a constitutional provision prohibiting a third-straight term.
Menem had already authored one constitutional change allowing him to run
for a second term. However, Menem argued that a third term was constitu-
tional because he had served only one term under the present constitution and
therefore was eligible to run for one additional term.66 Unabashed by
criticism, Menem promised to use "all judicial and political means necessary"
to ensure a bid for reelection.67 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Argentina
would have ruled on the constitutionality of Menem's bid for reelection.
Menem had packed the court with his supporters, and the opposition party
members threatened to impeach the judges of the Supreme Court if they
62 See id. (noting that sixty-four percent of Panamanians voted against the amendment).
63 See Brazil's Re-election Carnival, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 4 1.
6 See id.
65 See id. Pro-Cardoso Congress members controlled almost four hundred seats, while only
306 votes were needed to approve the constitutional amendment. Ultimately, 336 members
voted for the change while seventeen members voted against the proposal. In separate votes,
both houses of Congress approved the amendment. See id.
66 See Menem Forswears a Third Term,for 1999 Anyway, ECONOMIST, July 25, 1998, at
34.
67 Id.
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allowed Menem to run for another term.6' Faced with severe opposition from
Eduardo Duhalde, the mayor of Buenos Aires and a prominent member of his
own party, Menem announced that he would forswear a third term.69
Nevertheless, Menem continues to explore the possibility of a third term and
has even proposed a national referendum on the issue that would be legally
binding on the government.70 Menem conveniently ignored the fact that a
referendum can neither change the constitution nor bind Congress. Although
Menem continues to enjoy strong support from parts of the population, it is
unlikely that he could garner the support needed to win a national referendum
allowing his reelection.7'
Although theoretically working within the framework of the law, Menem's
actions. actually undermine the rule of law in Argentina. His willingness to
pack the Supreme Court of Argentina with his supporters and his willingness
to propose a referendum and pronounce it binding are steps that exceed the
scope of the constitution. Although these actions do not appear to be
egregious, they can have devastating consequences on a fragile democracy
with a discontent military.
C. Peru's President Ignores the Constitution
The greatest controversy in Latin American politics surrounds President
Fujimori's plans to run for a third term. Even though the Supreme Court of
Peru and the Peruvian Congress ultimately approved Fujimori's bid for
reelection, almost every step of the reelection controversy has been challenged
on constitutional grounds. Fujimori's political opposition denounced as
unconstitutional the reelection law passed by Congress allowing him to run for
reelection. Further, the methods used by Fujimori to pass the reelection law
and push his reelection agenda have also been questioned on constitutional
grounds. Lastly, many politicians, community groups, prestigious schools, and
scholars argued that the denial of a referendum allowing the people to decide
whether Fujimori should run for reelection also raises serious constitutional
issues.
1. The Reelection Question. The reelection controversy first emerged
in 1994 as Fujimori prepared for the 1995 elections, the first presidential
elections since the adoption of the 1993 Political Constitution. Unlike the
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See Meanwhile, in the Provinces, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1999, at 40.
71 See id.
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previous constitution, the 1993 Constitution allowed presidential reelection for
one consecutive term.72 A Peruvian citizen brought a complaint against
Fujimori arguing that the president was barred from seeking reelection because
he had been elected in 1990 under the 1979 Constitution which prohibited
reelection.73 This complaint came before the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones
("Election Board"), the body in charge of judging the eligibility of political
candidates.74 According to the constitution, the decisions of the Election
Board are final, definitive, and cannot be revised.7 As the parties debated
Fujimori's eligibility to run for office in 1995, both the president's advocate
as well as the Election Board asserted that the 1995-2000 term would be
Fujimori's second term in office.76 The Election Board concluded that
Fujimori could run for reelection in 1995. 77
With the question of reelection resolved in his favor, Fujimori devoted
himself to his presidential campaign. In an overwhelming show of approval,
sixty-five percent of Peruvians voted for Fujimori, and his supporters won a
majority in Congress.78 The majority of the population seemed to agree that
Fujimori's economic success and his success in curbing the violence of the
Shining Path overshadowed his attacks on democracy.79
2. Another Reelection Question. Soon after Fujimori's reelection, the
current constitutional crisis emerged. Although the reelection question had
seemingly been resolved, the president opened the debate once again by
suggesting the possibility of another bid for reelection. A third term would put
him in office until the year 2005.0 Article 112 of the new constitution clearly
promulgated a restriction of two consecutive presidential terms. During the
constitutional debates surrounding the adoption of article 112, Carlos Torres
y Torres Lara, then president of the Congress, attempted to quell the doubts of
opposition members with the following explanation:
72 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 112.
71 See Delia Revoredo de Mur, Nadie Puede Obstaculizar Ni Limitar Derecho del Pueblo
al Referindum (visited Sept. 3, 1998) <http://www3.larepublica.com.pe/1998/SETIEMBRE/
pdf3/politica.htm>. Delia Revoredo de Mur is the Dean of the School of Lawyers in Lima, Peru.
"' See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 178(1).
71 See id. art. 18 1.
76 See Revoredo de Mur, supra note 73.
17 See id.
7 See Fujimori Takes All, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 40.
79 See id.
'0 See Christopher Chazin, Peru's Fujimori Fights For 3rd Term Amid Hostage Crisis, Dow
JONES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, LATNEWS Library, DJNS File.
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I ask for the floor to reiterate that the proposal to be approved
only gives the president the possibility of two consecutive
terms. Do you want me to be more direct? I will. If Presi-
dent Fujimori becomes part of another electoral process he
will only be able to be president one more time because the
present term would count as one. I do not believe that I can
be any clearer."1
In addition, during the previous reelection debate, all parties referred to the
1995-2000 term as Fujimori's second term in office.82
Disregarding the clear language of article 112, as well as the clear language
of the constitutional debates, Congress adopted its own interpretation of article
112 in August of 1996. After ten hours of debate and a massive walkout by
opposition members, the pro-Fujimori congressional majority passed LawNo.
26657, more commonly know as the Law of Authentic Interpretation. This
law consists of one article and states:
Be it interpreted in an authentic way, that the reelection
referred to in Article 112 of the Constitution, refers to and is
conditional to the presidential terms begun after the date of
promulgation of the referred constitutional text. In conse-
quence, let it be authentically interpreted that in the computa-
tion, those presidential terms initiated before the validity of
the Constitution are not given account retroactively. 3
In essence, Congress sought an end to the reelection controversy by legalizing
Fujimori's run for a third term.
The opposition and media vigorously denounced this attempt to manipulate
the constitution. A leading Peruvian newspaper condemned the law as a "legal
coup d'etat. 84 To resolve this new reelection controversy, the Lima Lawyer's
Association challenged the Law of Authentic Interpretation before the
Tribunal Constitucional ("Constitutional Tribunal"). 85
SI Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
82 See Revoredo de Mur, supra note 73.
83 Law No. 26657, Congreso de la Repiiblica (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://www.
congreso.gob.pe/ccd/leyes/cronos/ 1996/1ey26657.htm>.
84 Politics: Way Cleared for Third Fujimori Term, WKLY. REP., Sept. 5, 1996, available in
Westlaw, PARERSLAT database.
85 See id.
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The Peruvian Supreme Court of Justice retains the final word on constitu-
tional law matters.86 The Peruvian judicial system also establishes a Constitu-
tional Court, a specialized body independent of, but that assists, the judicial
system.87 The Constitutional Court purports to be a completely independent
body "subject only to the Constitution and its Organic Law., 8 The court's
primary responsibilities consist of "dealing with actions of unconstitutionality
in a single instance, guaranteeing the supremacy of the Constitution and
declaring whether the diverse norms are constitutional or not."' 9 After
considering the Law of Authentic Interpretation, three of the seven justices
voted that Fujimori was ineligible to run for office in the 2000 presidential
elections. The remaining fourjustices abstained from voting.90 Those voting
against the law based their conclusion in large part on the ruling made by the
Election Board in 1994. The Election Board referred to the 1995-2000 term
as Fujimori's second term, and the constitution prohibited a third consecutive
term.9' The president of the Constitutional Tribunal approved the decision of
the three voting justices and denied Fujimori the right to run for another
consecutive term.92
Although Fujimori and his supporters in Congress tinkered with the
constitution in passing the Law of Authentic Interpretation, the ruling of the
Constitutional Tribunal demonstrated that the checks and balances necessary
for a democratic country still existed.
Subsequent events, however, cast profound doubt on the strength and
independence of the judiciary. The 1993 Constitution guaranteed judges
specific rights. Judges were guaranteed complete independence and were
bound only by the constitution and the law. Further, judges were guaranteed
permanent tenure as long as they conducted themselves properly on the job.93
Ignoring this constitutional provision, in May of 1997, Congress removed the
three justices that had voted against the Law of Authentic Interpretation.
Congress claimed that these justices violated judicial procedure by ruling on
86 See Legal System ofPeru, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1403, 1404 n.4 (1996).
87 See id. at 1405-06.
" Id. at 1406.
89 id.
9o See Revoredo de Mur, supra note 73.
9' See id.
92 See Calvin Sims, Peru's Congress Is Assailed Over its Removal of Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31, 1997, § 1, at4.
93 See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 146.
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behalf of the Constitutional Tribunal without having the appropriate quorum. 94
The three justices angrily denounced their removal as political punishment for
having voted against Fujimori's law. As a result, the president of the
Constitutional Tribunal resigned, agreeing that "the decision adopted by
Congress was based on politics and not on judicial or legal issues."95
Angry international reaction soon followed the removal of the three
justices. The United States Ambassador to Peru, Dennis Jett, saw this "as a
step backward" that would "weaken the whole democratic system. 96 Human
rights groups denounced the removal of the judges as the worst attack on
democracy since Fujimori's autogolpe in 1992. A deputy director for Human
Rights Watch/Americas asserted that "[t]here [were] no longer any checks on
Fujimori's power. He so thoroughly controls the Congress that he can get
them to do whatever he wants.
97
Fujimori, however, evinced no remorse over his refusal to heed the
Constitutional Tribunal and instead staunchly continued his quest for a third
presidential campaign. The Law of Authentic Interpretation came before the
Supreme Court in early 1998.98 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Constitutional Tribunal and ruled that the Law of Authentic Interpretation
was valid. Shocked, opposition leaders decried this ruling as an "unconstitu-
tional manipulation of the judiciary." 99 Critics pointed out that Congress
packed the Supreme Court with pro-Fujimori judges and that this ruling was
simply another authoritarian act by the president."
In response to Fujimori's abuse of power, opposition groups followed the
lead of many of Peru's neighbors and called for a referendum, a right only
recently given to Peruvians under the 1993 Constitution.0'
9 See Jonathan Friedland, Peruvians Recoilfrom Fujimori, Despite Peace, Prosperity He
Won, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1997, at A 1l.
9s Id.
96 Sims, supra note 92, § 1, at 4.
97 Id.
9' See Peru Court: Fujimori Can Seek 3rd Term, CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1998, § 1, at 13.
" Id.
'0o See id.
'10 Unlike Peru, other countries in the region have used the referendum process many times
over the years in attempts to preserve democracy and remove dictators. In 1917, Uruguay was
the first South American country to incorporate the referendum as a constitutional right. Since
that time, Uruguay has held eight referendums, the most important in 1982. The 1982
Referendum played an important role in restoring democracy in Uruguay. The military
dictatorship allowed a referendum concerning the adoption of a new constitution. The people
overwhelmingly voted against the new constitution showing instead their support for the 1966
Constitution adopted by the people. Because of the clear demand for the return to democratic
rule, the military allowed presidential and municipal elections. Following this example, the
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The opposition movement Foro Democratico (the Forum) hoped to use its
new right to call a referendum as a way of halting what it considered
Fujimori's anti-democratic bid for more power through a third presidential
candidacy. Article 31 of the 1993 Constitution states that "the citizens have
the right to participate in political affairs through the means of a
referendum."'' 0 2 Article 32 specifies four categories of issues that can be
submitted to the referendum process:
1. The total or partial reform of the Constitution
2. The approval of norms that have the status of law
3. Municipal ordinances
4. Materials relevant to the process of decentralization.' 3
The Forum intended to call a referendum to afford the Peruvian people the
opportunity to approve or reject the Law of Authentic Interpretation. The
Forum collected the 1.4 million signatures needed to call a referendum and
presented these signatures to the National Office of Electoral Processes
("ONPE").' 4 In this case, the ONPE took the 1.4 million signatures gathered
for the express purpose of calling for a referendum and used them instead to
fulfill the three-tenths of one percent required to support a legislative
initiative.'0 5 All this was done without the consent of the Forum.
The Forum's rights continued to be disregarded by Congress. Article 14
of Law 26300 states that "those that present the [legislative] initiative may
name two representatives to sustain and defend the initiative in the congressio-
nal commissions and in the process of reconsideration.', 0 6 The initiative was
slated to appear before the Constitutional Commission. Representatives of the
Forum, citing their rights under article 14 of Law 26300, requested an
audience before the Commission to explain the purpose of the signatures and
the usurpation of the will of the people.0 7 Instead, ONPE sent the measure
Chilean people held a referendum where they rejected the rule of their dictator, General
Pinochet. The only countries in Latin America not guaranteeing a constitutional right to hold
a referendum are Mexico, Bolivia, Honduras, and El Salvador. See Francisco Mir6 Quesada
Rada, El Referdndum en el Mundo, EL COMERCIO (published Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.
elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/1998/9/I 5/fs5n7.htm>.
102 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 3 1.
1o3 Id. art. 32.
104 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
o See id.
'0 Ley No. 26300, Congreso de la Republica de Peru (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://www.
congreso.gob.pe/ccd/leyes/cronos/1 994/ley26300.htm>, art. 14.
"07 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
directly to Congress allowing Congress to either approve or reject the
referendum.0 8
3. Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say. On August 28, 1998, a
historic congressional debate took place. On one side, Fujimori's supporters
opposed invalidation of the Law of Authentic Interpretation and opposed, as
well, any calls for a referendum. On the other side, the opposition argued that
the Law of Authentic Interpretation should be found unconstitutional and,
further, that the Peruvian people should be allowed to exercise their constitu-
tional right to call for a referendum. The majority party, although making
some valid arguments, undermined its position by consistently reinterpreting
laws in glaring contradiction to their apparent meanings. In the end, in part
because of the majority's skill in manipulating words and legal arguments, the
people lost constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.
Tensions ran high as Congress began deliberating on the referendum issue.
Approximately one thousand protesters, many of them university students,
gathered outside Congress shouting their support for the referendum.'0 9 Some
of the students evaded the police and made their way inside Congress where
they shouted their support for the opposition throughout the debate. "0 Among
the members of Congress, tempers raged, culminating in one member slugging
another after being insulted. '' The president of Congress attempted to stress
the importance of the debate and the necessity to keep calm and allow the
arguments to proceed."
2
This debate centered around two issues. First, Congress discussed the
validity of the referendum issue coming before Congress. The opposition
argued that Congress had no legal authority to rule on the referendum but
rather that the debate was an usurpation of the power given to the people by
the 1993 Constitution to call a referendum. Second, Congress discussed the
fundamental concern-should the people, through a referendum, decide
whether Fujimori could run for a third presidential term. The opposition
argued that a refusal to allow a referendum violated the constitution and
exposed Fujimori's authoritarian beliefs.
log See id.
"09 See Peru Leader Eligible for Election in 2000, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29, 1998, at A 12,
available in 1998 WL 2683209.
"o See El Insulto Como Instrumento de Defensa, EL COMERCIO (published Aug. 29, 1998)
<http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/1998/9/l/fs5n86.htm>.
111 See id.
112 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2. Much of the following information about the
debate comes from the transcript of the congressional debate.
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The opposition first asserted that because proper civil procedure had not
been followed, Congress lacked the power to debate this issue." 3 The ONPE,
the organization presenting the legislative initiative, had taken signatures
gathered in support of a referendum and had used them, without consulting
with the Forum, to support this legislative initiative. Only a member of
Congress or the signatures of three-tenths of one percent of the electorate
could bring a bill in front of Congress." 4
The majority party countered that in this case, it was best to dispense with
the proceeding before the Constitutional Commission and instead debate the
issue before the whole Congress because the issue was of great national
importance and would eventually come before Congress anyway." 5 The
majority easily won the vote to continue the debate and to proceed to the
principle issue of whether the government should allow a referendum. The
majority party's disregard for procedure is troublesome, especially as the
procedural rights guaranteed the very important substantive right of allowing
the proposal to be defended before the appropriate committee. Fujimori's
party did not spend time arguing that the presentation of this bill was valid.
Instead, it simply justified the act because of the importance of the subject
matter.
The central debate concerned both the legal and moral justifications for and
against the referendum. The legal debate concerned the modification of Law
26300 leading to restrictions on the constitutionally guaranteed right to call for
a referendum. Putting legality aside, the opposition also questioned the
morality of refusing the Peruvian people the opportunity to decide whether
Fujimori should be allowed to run for a third term.
Article 31 of the 1993 Constitution gave Peruvians the right to call for a
referendum. Further, article 31 stated that any act that prohibited or limited
the rights of the citizenry in this area was null and punishable."l6 However, in
September of 1996, Congress recognized that Law 26300 abrogated the rights
guaranteed under articles 31 and 32 of the constitution. 7 Article 39 of Law
26300 established four areas that could be subject to a referendum:
1. The total or partial reform of the Constitution in
accordance with article 206 of the same.
..3 See id.
"' See Ley No. 26300, supra note 106.
"5 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
116 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 31.
117 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
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2. To approve a law, regional law of general character
and municipal ordinances.
3. To disapprove of laws, legislative decrees, and urgent
decrees, as well as the laws referred to in the previous
category.
4. In the materials referred to in article 190 of the Consti-
tution according to special law.'
Under Law 26300, a referendum would still be appropriate in this case as the
Forum's petition fell under the third category of disapproval of laws. The
interpretation of this article came under scrutiny and finally the Jurado
Electoral ("the Jurado"), the governmental body determining election and
referendum issues, further clarified the prerequisites for calling a referendum.
The Jurado determined that for categories one, two, and four, a referendum
could not be called until the initiative was presented and rejected by
Congress." 9 Category three was not included and therefore did not require a
rejected legislative initiative. Thus, it was proper for the Forum to collect the
signatures in disapproval of the Law of Authentic Interpretation even before
the issue was debated and rejected by Congress.
In April of 1997, though, the right to a referendum was further restricted
by Law 26592. This law states:
Every referendum requires a legislative initiative rejected by
Congress, the same which can be submitted to a referendum
in conformance with this law, only if it counts with the
favorable vote of no less than 2/5 of the votes of the legal
number of the members of Congress.'20
Opposition leaders scathingly rejected this legal maneuver used to trump
their call for a referendum. First, the constitution guaranteed the right to hold
a referendum, then through the passage of Law 26300 Congress restricted this
right, and finally after passing Law 26592, Congress gave itself the right to
completely reject the people's call for a referendum. Senator Avendano
Valdez contended that Law 26592 was invalid because the Jurado had already
declared that referendums disapproving laws did not need a rejected legislative
1 Ley No. 26300, supra note 106, art. 39.
"9 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
120 Ley No. 26592, Congreso de la Repzblica (visited Sept. 21, 1998), <http://www.
congreso.gob.pe/ccd/leyes/cronos/1 996/1ey26592.htm>.
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initiative. 2 ' According to the constitution, the decisions of the Jurado are final
and cannot be changed. 22 Therefore, Congress did not have the power to pass
Law 26592 requiring a rejected legislative initiative. Further, the opposition
contended that Congress did not have the power to require a two-fifths vote of
approval by Congress before allowing a referendum to proceed. Article 31 of
the constitution guaranteed the right to a referendum and also stated that any
limitation of this right was null and subject to punishment."23 Senator Valdez
noted that the right to call a referendum was an "unrestricted right, and in
consequence the famous law that establishes Congress as a filter, is a law that
violates the constitution.'' 24 The senator emphasized the strong language used
in this article-limitations were null and subject to punishment. 25 He
commented that few times in the constitution were such clear and strong words
used.
26
The majority party countered with its own legal arguments. First, it noted
that the constitution did not forbid modifications of the rights concerning
referendums. Second, Fujimori's party accused the Forum of committing
fraud in the collection and presentation of the 1.4 million signatures needed to
call for a referendum.
Senator Delgado Paricio, a member of the Change Ninety-New Majority
party (C90-NM), responded to the criticisms of the changes made to the
referendum guarantee of article 31 of the constitution. In full this article
states:
The citizens have the right to participate in public affairs
through the referendum; legislative initiative; removal or
renewal of the authorities and the demand of an accounting of
affairs. They also have the right to be elected and to freely
elect their representatives, in accordance with the conditions
and procedures determined by the organic law. 
27
'2' See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
122 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 181.
123 Id. art. 3 1.
124 Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
125 See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 31.
126 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2. Supporting Senator Valdez, Senator Reto Neyra
affirmed that judicial instability, including the reinterpretation of the Constitution and the
passing, abrogating, and modifying of laws, could lead to democratic instability as well. Id.
"From the point of view of the judiciary," he continued, "Article 31 of the Constitution" is clear
in guaranteeing the right to a referendum. Id.
127 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 3 1.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The majority party picked out the last phrase-"according to the conditions
and procedures determined by the organic law"-and argued that the right to
a referendum was conditioned by the organic law. 2  This would give
Congress the power to pass laws, such as Law 26300 and 26592, changing the
guarantees given in the constitution.
There are two problems with this argument, however. First, the beginning
sentence of article 31 guaranteeing the right to a referendum does not
subordinate this right to any other law. Only the right to elect and be elected
is conditioned by the organic laws of the country. Second, as the opposition
argued later in the debate, even if the phrase does apply to the right to call a
referendum, there is a difference between limiting a law and having to meet
the conditions and procedures established by other laws. 29 One senator
explained, "Conditions, there can be; procedures, there can be: how it [the
referendum] is asked for, who asks for it . . . But the right cannot be
limited."'
130
Senator Torres y Torres Lara, distinguished Peruvian constitutional scholar,
continued the legal debate for the majority party. Lara began his discussion
distinguishing the situation in Peru and the situation with President Menem in
Argentina.'3 ' As noted earlier,132 Argentina had a similar constitutional
provision forbidding reelection, and Menem tried the same argument advanced
by Fujimori, claiming that only presidential terms commenced after the new
constitution counted for reelection purposes. Unlike the Peruvian Constitu-
tion, however, the Argentine Constitution included a statement explaining that
Menem's term at the time of adoption of the new constitution should be
considered his first term. 33 While an interesting distinction, this argument
does not prove that Fujimori should be able to run for another term. It only
proves that Menem was even bolder in his attempt at reelection.
Lara next dealt with the role of Congress in interpreting the constitution.
He gave numerous examples of congressional interpretation of the constitu-
tion. 34 He concluded that "the history of interpretation is absolutely long in
our history, not only under former constitutions, but also under this
constitution."' 35 Throughout the debate, though, the opposition members were
"2' Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
129 See id.
130 id.
131 See id.
131 See supra Part I.B.
'33 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
114 See id.
135 Id.
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not challenging the right of Congress to interpret the constitution, but rather
they were challenging the correctness of their interpretation. Senator Torres
y Torres Lara seemed to gloss over this fact.
Finally, Lara argued that it was necessary to have a representative
democracy as opposed to a direct democracy. All agreed, he noted, that a
direct democracy posed great dangers and that the new constitution established
a combination of direct and representative democracy.' 36 Moreover, he
contended that requiring the rejection of a legislative initiative and a two-fifths
vote by Congress before approving a referendum would establish the proper
balance and keep the masses from controlling the government by always
calling for a referendum.' He stated that Law 26300 clarified this position,
and after the lurado misinterpreted this law, it was necessary to pass Law
26592.138
Senator Torres y Torres Lara failed, however, to address some important
issues. The majority party wrote the constitution. If direct democracy were
so dangerous, why did the constitution guarantee the right to call a referendum
without the need for congressional approval. He also failed to address the
constitutional provision that all changes to the right to call a referendum would
be null and subject to punishment.
While the opposition's constitutional argument appears stronger, the
majority did advance some important concerns surrounding the validity of the
signatures presented by the Forum. The Forum presented the list of names and
election numbers (similar to American social security numbers) in the form of
three compact discs. Almost immediately, irregularities were noticed as
names appeared multiple times with falsified signatures.'39 One television
correspondent interviewed a man, asking him if he had signed a referendum
petition. The man denied adding his signature to the campaign. The
correspondent proceeded to show the man that his name and election number
appeared twelve times on the lists.'" The man confirmed that although his
name and election number were used, the signature was not his. The reporter
cited numerous cases throughout the records of duplicated names and
numbers. 4' The majority concluded that the Forum deliberately committed
fraud in the collection of the signatures. One senator concluded that up to
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
"9 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
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forty percent of the signatures could be omitted due to irregularities.142 The
opposition responded that any error was due to the transmission of the names,
signatures, and election numbers from paper sources to the electronic source.
Senator Chavez Cossio de Ocamp (C90-NM) aptly responded that "if this is
a digital error, it sure is an intelligent one." '143
Throughout the debate, the congressional opposition parties never
adequately responded to the charges of fraud. Ironically, however, at the time
of the debate, ONPE, the body in charge of verifying the signatures for
authenticity, had not examined any of the signatures. In a newspaper article
dated September 11, 1998, the head of the ONPE stated that not one of the
more than 1.4 million signatures had been tested for authenticity'" For this
reason, neither side has a particularly credible argument concerning the
validity of the signatures.
Although both sides argued the legal side of the controversy, the opposition
also passionately asserted the need to protect democracy from an authoritarian
government. While the government could manipulate the laws to restrict the
referendum, the will of the people could not be ignored without diminishing
and eventually destroying democracy.
Senator Flores Nano began the impassioned plea for the preservation of the
referendum. She noted that polls indicated that over sixty percent of the
electorate favored the referendum. 4 The real issue, therefore, was not the
exact number of valid signatures collected but rather whether Congress would
listen to the voice of millions of Peruvians calling for the referendum.'"
Following her, numerous opposition members continued to plead that
democracy be respected by allowing the referendum to go forward as
guaranteed in the constitution.
47
The majority party ignored the arguments based on the need for the
preservation of democracy and focused mainly on the legal arguments. One
senator stated that the majority party was not against the referendum; it simply
142 See id.
143 Id.
'44 See Jefe de ONPE Se Retine Con Fiscal Ad Hoc que Investiga Denuncia de Fraude
Electr6nico, EL COMERCIO (published Sept. 11, 1998) <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/
webcomercio/1998/9/15/fs5n230.htm>.
,45 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
146 See id. Although this senator stated that sixty percent of the populace backed the
referendum, most sources put the number at or above seventy-five percent. See Foro
Democr6tico Anuncia Paro Civico Para el 30 de Setiembre (visited Sept. 14, 1998) <http://
www.gestion.com.pe/archivo/ago/1998/28/5POLI.htm>.
147 See Diario de los Debates, supra note 2.
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wanted the opposition to garner the votes necessary to approve the
referendum. 48 This argument is far from convincing, however, because all of
the majority members denounced the referendum and asserted their support for
Fujimori's bid for a third term.
After thirteen hours of debate, Congress finally voted on the referendum. 49
For all the fiery rhetoric and passionate pleas, the opposition failed to muster
the votes necessary to approve the referendum. Forty-five members voted for
the referendum, six senators were absent, one abstained, and sixty-seven voted
against the referendum. 50 Upon hearing the results of the vote, clashes broke
out between demonstrators waiting outside of Congress and the police. The
demonstrators held up signs proclaiming, "Referendum is Democracy" and
"No to Reelection."''
4. Effects of the Vote. Both politicians and citizens considered the
Peruvian congressional debate to have serious ramifications. The country and
the world wait expectantly to see the effects of this vote on democracy in Peru
and in the region. While the results cannot be predicted with certainty, there
are some areas of concern. First, the rise of protest against the government and
the ensuing violence couldjeopardize the stability of the government. Second,
there is concern that after winning this victory, Fujimori will be emboldened
to commit fraud in order to win a third term.
Almost as soon as the vote result was made known, organizers around the
country began mounting protests. Ten thousand protesters marched through
Cuzco, an important mountain city."2 The marchers asserted that the vote
against the referendum was a vote against democracy. Signs read: "Stop the
Dictatorship!" and "Stop the Constant Running Over Democratic
Institutions!"'5 3 Around the country, in Cajamarca, Jaen, Comas, Pisco, Ica,
Piura, Huaraz, and Chimbote protesters demanded the return to democracy.
The mayor of Lima stated that Fujimori had a "fatal obsession for staying in
power indefinitely," and, in consequence, Peruvians were confronting an
"authoritarian government- a dictatorship disguised as a democracy."' 154 The
148 See id.
'4 See El Insulto Como Instrumento de Defensa, supra note 110.
ISO See Mayoria OficialistaAcab6 Ayer Con elReferdndum (visited Sept. 14, 1998) <http://
www.gestion.com.pe/archivo/1998/ ago/28\IPOLI.htm>.
151 Id.
352 See Cusquehos Dyeron; iNo! a la Dictadura (published Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www3.
larepublica.com.pe/1 998/SETIEMBRE/pdf3/politica.htm>.
'5 Id.
' Alcalde de Lima Afirma que Presidente Fujimori Tiene Obsesi6n Por El Poder (visited
Sept. 14, 1998) <http://www.gestion.com.pe/archivo/1 998/ago/28\1 0POLI.htm>.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Forum, the group responsible for collecting the signatures, announced almost
immediately that it would wage a "campaign of democratic resistance
confronting authoritarianism and fraud.'1 5 The Forum proceeded to call a
general strike for September 30, 1998.56
Although this was to be a peaceful strike, the people's dissatisfaction with
the government soon resulted in violence. Workers, union supporters,
students, and various other spectators gathered around the chained iron gates
of the Presidential Palace. 57 Soldiers guarding the Palace retreated after
someone in the crowd threw a smoke bomb. Heartened by this, the protesters,
sticks and metal rods in hand, banged on the outer gates until they finally gave
way, allowing the protesters to march into the patio of the Palace. The
marchers first threw rocks at the windows of the Palace. 58 The protesters then
began beating at the door of the Presidential Palace. They were able to open
one door that led to the quarters of the Palace's color guard. The marchers
grabbed the guards' instruments and began playing their protest marches.
Others grabbed the colorful uniforms and began throwing them in the air. 5 9
On-lookers applauded the actions of the marchers until the police forces finally
entered the building, pushing the protesters out of the area. 60
The use of violence, coupled with the lack of respect shown by the
marchers toward the Presidential Palace, the symbol of government and of the
presidency, is troublesome. Perhaps a connection exists between Fujimori's
perceived lack of respect for laws and the willingness of the people to
disregard laws. Luis Guerrero, president of the Association of Municipalities
of Peru, stated that the rule of law no longer existed in Peru.' 6 1 "The
constitution and the laws have been violated," he said in an interview with a
... Foro Democrdtico Anuncia el Inicio de "Campaiia de Resistencia Democnitica," EL
COMERCIO (published Aug. 30, 1998) <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/varios/referendum/
fs5n 100.htm>.
156 See Foro Democrdtico Anuncia Paro Civico para el 30 de Seliembre (visited Sept. 14,
1998) <http://www.gestion.com.pe/archivo/1 998/ago/28\5POLl.htm>.
117 See La Violencia y Las Balas Estremecieron Ambientes de Palacio de Gobierno, EL
COMERCiO (published Oct. 1, 1998) <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/1998/10/
1/fs3nl.htm>.
158 See id.
159 See id.
'6o See id.
161 See No Existen Garantias Para Elecciones Limpiasy Transparentes en el 2000 (visited
Sept. 14, 1998) <http://www.gestion.com.pe/archivo/1998/ago/3 l\4POLI.htm>.
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Peruvian newspaper. 62 "The chief, the power of the State, in violating [the
norms] is opening the doors for everyone to violate all [laws]."' 63
Equally troublesome is the lackluster job of the military police in protecting
the Palace and the president. When protest marches take place, police usually
block off the area in front of the Palace. In this case, the area was unguarded,
and when the police saw the protesters attempt to break down the gate, they
retreated rather than confront the crowd.'6' Only women guarded the Palace,
and they were quickly moved to one side by the protesters. 65 Later in the
evening, some protesters returned, climbed up on a Palace balcony and painted
anti-government slogans on the wall. Not a single police officer remained in
the area.166 Fujimori remained inside the Palace while all of these events took
place.
167
Perhaps the actions of the police were simply an attempt to avoid
bloodshed, yet the duty to protect the president, especially since he was in the
Palace, should have been of utmost importance to them. The failure to
establish order and enforce the rule of law runs counter to a democratic
society, which functions because of the respect given to the law.
Protests against Fujimori continue, most recently after the December 31,
1999, ruling by the Election Board that Fujimori is eligible to run for a third
term in office. 68 On December 27, Fujimori announced that he would run for
a third term in the April 9, 2000, elections. 69 This announcement was quickly
followed by the Election Board's vote of approval. On January 6, around
4,000 protesters took to the streets to demonstrate against the Election Board's
decision.' 70 Although riot police were on hand, the demonstrations were
relatively peaceful. It remains to be seen, however, whether the protests will
continue to be peaceful as the April 9th election approaches.
While constitutional changes certainly do not offend democratic principles,
attempts to simply reinterpret or ignore constitutional limitations do under-
162 id.
163 Id.
'64 See Jefe de Estado Permaneci6 en su Despacho Durante Graves Incidentes, EL
COMERciO (published Oct. 1, 1998) <http://www.eicomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/1998/10/
l/fs3n6.htm>.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 See Thousands Protest Peruvian President's Re-election Bid (visited Jan. 30, 2000)
<http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/O 1/06/peru.protests.ap/index.html>.
169 See id.
170 See id.
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mine the rule of constitutional law. Fujimori's attempt simply to reinterpret
the constitution to his liking manifests a great disrespect for constitutional rule.
IV. THE STABILITY OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
Recent democratic elections offer both hope that democracy continues to
grow in Latin America as well as some concern that military leaders continue
to exert great power over Latin American countries. Peru and Brazil stand as
evidence that free and open elections remain intact. In Venezuela and
Paraguay, however, the rising popularity of former coup leaders in election
campaigns has raised doubt as to the people's commitment to democracy.
Peru held municipal elections in October of 1998, just two months after the
referendum debate. Many opposition members voiced concern over the
integrity of the voting process and the continuation of free and fair elections. 7'
Luis Guerrero, head of the Association of Municipalities of Peru, stated that
Fujimori's actions left grave doubts that fair and transparent elections would
be guaranteed in the year 2000. While these concerns were valid, the October
elections shed hope that the next presidential elections would be free and fair.
Some irregularities did occur, however, and the Election Board annulled
results in four districts of the department of Ayacucho. 172 Further, the mayor
of Miraflores, a large district in the capital city Lima, denounced the Election
Board for not investigating alleged irregularities in his district. Despite this,
on the whole, the elections appeared to be a fair demonstration of the will of
the people.'73 For example, a fiery opponent of President Fujimori was
'7 See No Existen Garantias Para Elecciones Limpiasy Transparentes en el 2000 (visited
Sept. 14, 1998) <http://www.gestion.com.pe/archivo/I998/ago/3 I\4POLI.htm>.
172 See Declaran Nulas las Elecciones en Cuatro Distritos en el Departamento deAyacucho,
EL COMERCIO (published Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/
1998/12/18/fs26n87.htm>.
17- In spite of Fujimori's authoritarian acts, it is utterly remarkable to note the difference
between the 1990 elections (when Fujimori first came to power) and the most recent 1998
elections. In 1990, the Peruvian terrorist group Shining Path terrorized both general and
municipal elections. In the months leading up to the municipal elections, over sixty mayors and
mayoral candidates were killed. Over five hundred candidates withdrew out of fear for their
lives. This fear extended to the voters. Close to sixty percent of registered voters either
invalidated their vote or refused to vote even though voting is required and failure to vote carries
a stiff fine. In one mountain city, virtually controlled by terrorists, eighty-five percent of the
population failed to vote. The general elections suffered a similar fate. Shining Path carried out
a campaign of bombings and general strikes. The hillsides surrounding Lima were aglow with
torches shaped as the hammer and sickle. On the other hand, the 1998 municipal elections had
little if any violence, and voters were free to cast their ballots for their candidate of choice. See
Simon Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, in LATIN AMERICA AND
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reelected as mayor of Lima. Also, in many regions, independent candidates
rather than those affiliated with the president were elected. 74 As in Peru,
Brazil's October elections proceeded without problems and returned President
Cardoso to power.'
By contrast, in both Venezuela and Paraguay, former coup leaders chose
to run for office. In Venezuela, voter participation consistently declined in the
last decade reaching an all time low in the 1993 general elections.' 76 The
absenteeism rate rose to 41.7 percent, doubling the previous record.'77 In
1998, however, increased excitement surrounded the presidential elections and
the candidacy of Hugo Chavez, who only six years before had led a failed coup
attempt against the government. 178 On December 6, 1998, Hugo Chavez
became the new president of Venezuela.' During his victory speech, Chavez
emphasized his commitment to democracy and free market reform. Critics,
however, troubled about Chavez's anti-democratic past, worried about his
campaign promise to establish a special constituent assembly. This body
would be composed of a cross-section of the population and would have the
power to bypass the opposition dominated Congress.' To appease the
opposition, Chavez intimated that rather than replace Congress, this special
assembly would simply complement the work of Congress. The new assembly
could discuss such issues as ending the ban on presidential reelection while
Congress would address more technical reform topics.'
On July 25, 1999, Venezuelans went to the polls to elect the members of
the new constituent assembly.8 2 In an overwhelming victory, Chavez's
followers won 121 of the 128 seats in the new assembly.8 3 Almost immedi-
ately the new assembly began reviewing corruption charges against judges and
began preparing to remove those judges found guilty of corruption. '8 When
Congress decided to return from its recess to address this new development,
THE CARIBBEAN: PROSPECTS FORDEMOCRACY 207, 216-17 (William Gutteridge ed., 1997).
174 See Peru: Possible Presidents, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 38.
' See Brazil's Steady Nerve: Thank President Herrique Cardoso and the Voters Who Have
Just Re-elected Him, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1998, at 16.
176 See Enrique A. Baloyra, DeepingDemocracy with Dominant Parties and Presidentialism,
in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 38.
177 See id.
178 See The Colonel Rides On, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 1998, at 35.
79 See A Message From the People, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998, at 35.
Iso See id.
181 See id.
..2 See Chavez Cleans the Slate, ECONOMIST, July 31, 1999, at 29.
183 See Chavez's Power Grab, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1999, at 27.
184 See id.
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the new assembly passed laws that stripped Congress of most of its power.
8 1
Finally, on September 10, 1999, an agreement was reached, allowing Congress
to reconvene in October and giving the new assembly the duty of rewriting the
constitution. 186 While critics are quick to doubt Chavez's commitment to
democracy, Chavez has declared that his "intention is to rebuild institutions,
to strengthen democracy."' 87 Only time will tell whether these intentions are
genuine.
In Paraguay, the presidential elections sparked a constitutional debate that
threatened to undermine democratic rule. Lino Oviedo, the leader of the 1996
coup attempt, won the presidential nomination of his party.'88 Afterwards,
however, the Supreme Court of Paraguay upheld the ten-year prison term
imposed on Oviedo by a military tribunal, and he was forced to abandon the
presidential race. 18  Still demonstrating their support for Oviedo, the
Paraguayan people elected his running mate, Raul Cubas, as the new president.
After winning the presidency, one of President Cubas's first acts in office was
to free his friend and mentor, Oviedo.' 90 Following this pardon, President
Cubas arranged a second military tribunal, composed mostly of Oviedo's
friends, that dismissed all charges against him.' 9' The vice-president of
Paraguay admitted that Cubas's decision to pardon Oviedo was founded on "a
slightly exotic interpretation" of Paraguayan law. 192 Paraguay's Supreme
Court declared Cubas's acts unconstitutional and ruled that Oviedo must go
back to jail. 93 While at first lacking the two-thirds majority necessary to
impeach President Cubas, the Paraguayan Congress did possess the simple
majority needed to block all legislation.' 94 The controversy between Congress
and the president continued to rage with the vice-president speaking out
IS5 See id.
186 See Mike Williams, Chavez Shakes Up Venezuela-and the Hemisphere, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Sept. 19, 1999, at B 1. Following the lead of other Latin American presidents, Chavez
proposes to change the constitution to allow the president to serve two consecutive six-year
terms. Under the current constitution, the president may only serve one, five-year term. See
Caribbean Jacobinism, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 29-30.
187 Williams, supra note 186.
'" See Paraguay's General Makes His Come-back, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1998, at 33.
189 See Deadlock, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998, at 36.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 New Paraguayan President Frees Former General Jailed in '96 Incident (visited Jan. 23,
1998) <http://cnn.com/WORLD/americas/980 8/l 9/paraguay.general/index.html>.
193 See Deadlock, supra note 189, at 36.
'94 See id.
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defiantly against the acts of President Cubas.' 95 In a bloody turn of events,
Vice-President Argana was murdered on March 23, 1999.196 Witnesses claim
that the murderers were dressed in army fatigues. The murder of Argana
finally convinced two-thirds of Congress that President Cubas should be
impeached. 97 Rather than face a trial, Cubas resigned and sought asylum in
Brazil.'98 Lino Oviedo also fled the country and was given asylum in
Argentina.'99
These tumultuous events have lessened the optimism surrounding
Paraguay's democratic and peaceful presidential election. The new president,
although a supporter of the slain vice-president, still has many ties to the
previous military regime. 200 Further, Lino Oviedo may still have plans to
regain control not only of his party but also of the country. For now, though,
the country's fragile democracy appears to have been preserved.
V. THE STABILITY OF THE JUDICIARY
Finally, in determining the strength of democracy, the state of the judiciary
warrants consideration. A strong judiciary bringing about "an enforceable,
compulsory, and foreseeable rule of law" is an essential foundation for a
strong democracy.2' Historically, though, many of the judicial systems in
Latin America have been strongly controlled both by overly political factions
and by the other branches of government.2 2 This has led not only to a weak
and ineffective judiciary but also to a weaker democracy. President Fujimori
cited the extreme power of the judiciary as a justification for his coup."' The
military officers behind the coup in Venezuela noted the corruption of the
judiciary as one reason for their coup attempt.2"
Several obstacles, including political instability, corruption in the judicial
system, and powerful groups with private interests in maintaining the status
,95 See Fratricide, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1999, at 38.
196 See id.
197 See id.
9 See Paraguay, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, at 36.
'99 See id.
200 See The Woes of Three Uncertain Mini-democracies, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1999, at 29.
20 Edgardo Buscaglia, Obstacles to Judicial Reform in Latin America, in JUSTICE DELAYED:
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 15, 15 (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998).
202 See id.
203 See Jorge Correa Sutil,Modernization, Democratization andJudicial Systems, in JUSTICE
DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 201, at 97, 97.
204 See id.
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quo, have hindered judicial reform over the years.2 °5 As a consequence, the
public has little trust in the judiciary.2" Further, this distrust has been
heightened by the slow workings of the judiciary and by the limited access to
the judiciary.2 7 Although these obstacles are serious, many Latin American
countries, along with constitutional reform, have also begun much needed
judicial reform.
In Colombia, the 1991 Constitution reaffirmed the independence of the
judiciary and set up controls allowing it to work free of interference from the
other branches.2 8 Colombia's 1886 Constitution established the independence
of the judiciary, but a strong executive power slowly eroded this
independence.209 The executive branch gained power over the judiciary by
expanding the role of the military courts. The constitution provided that
military courts would have jurisdiction over "crimes committed by members
of the military while on active duty and relating to military service. ' ,210 This
provision was interpreted broadly and soon included jurisdiction over common
crimes committed by members of the military and civilians in the employment
of the military.2 ' The government's establishment of the Courts of Public
Order furthered weakened the judiciary by giving these special courts
jurisdiction over terrorist crimes or activities linked with terrorism. Also, the
executive branch restricted the right to habeas corpus.1 2
On July 4, 1991, Colombia adopted its new constitution and incorporated
substantial reforms into the structure and operation of the judicial system.23
The new constitution created new judicial bodies and significantly altered the
functions of the older bodies. The Office of Public Prosecution (Fiscalia
General) was created to prosecute crimes. Through this system, the Colom-
bian judiciary moved toward an accusatory system of justice rather than the
traditional inquisitorial style, where the judge had the sole power to investigate
and prosecute crimes.21 4
205 See Buscaglia, supra note 201, at 21-29.
206 See N6stor Humberto Martinez, Rule of Law and Economic Efficiency, in JUSTICE
DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 201, at 3, 3.
207 See id. at 7-8.
20 See Donald T. Fox & Anne Stetson, The 1991 Constitutional Reform: Prospects for
Democracy and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 139, 150 (1992).
209 See id.
210 Id. at 150-5 1.
21 Seeid. at 151.
212 See id. at 152.
211 See LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 241-44 (1998).
214 See id. at 244.
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The right of habeas corpus also was strengthened, especially in regards to
the military courts." 5 Petitions for habeas corpus were required to be
answered within thirty-six hours. Further, citizens could seek an immediate
injunction for any act or omission by a public official that violated any
constitutional right.2'6 Within ten days, a court was required to either grant or
deny the injunction and any appeal would proceed before the Constitutional
Court.
2 17
While these reforms are an encouraging start toward an effective and
democratic judiciary, two areas pose special concern. First, the military
continues to exert considerable power in the judicial sector. Military courts
have "exclusive and final jurisdiction over crimes committed by officials
during the course of active duty or during counterinsurgency operations. 2 8
Further, these courts also exert jurisdiction over the police. A second area of
concern involves the special courts used to try terrorism and drug
trafficking. 2 9 Although reforms have been made to these courts, including
affirming the prisoner's right to habeas corpus, the controversy remains over
the courts' existence in the first place.220
As with any reform, the changes have been criticized because of their poor
implementation and also because of the political ramifications of the
changes.22 ' However, the reformers' work should not be disparaged.222 While
the future remains uncertain, there is hope that these same forces that rose up
to demand judicial reform will also work together to make thejudicial reforms
effective.
Chile's return to democracy after the rule of Pinochet led to many
proposals for judicial reform as well. As in Colombia, the Chilean military
courts had extensive jurisdiction.223 One study suggested that during
Pinochet's rule around ninety-five percent of all people prosecuted by military
courts were civilians that had committed non-military crimes.224 Because of
215 See id. at 244-45.
216 See id. at 245.
217 See id.
218 id.
219 See id.
220 See id. Especially objectionable is the use of "faceless judges." Id.
221 See id. at 246-47.
222 See id. at 248.
221 See Robert G. Vaughn, Proposals for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
577, 591 (1992/1993).
224 See id.
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laws giving military courts criminal jurisdiction over civilians, the military
courts actually handled more cases than the civilian courts.225
In some areas legislation has been passed restricting military jurisdiction,
and proposals have been made to further restrict the jurisdiction of military
courts.226 One proposal includes supervision of military courts by civilian
courts.
While these countries offer an encouraging picture, Peru's judicial branch
offers a somewhat bleaker view. During 1992, President Fujimori began
setting up military tribunals in an attempt to bring quick and effective justice
22upon accused terrorists. 27 In order to protect the judges and prosecutors from
retaliation from terrorists, these courts were made up of "faceless" military
judges.228 Critics argued that these military trials proceeded too quickly for the
judges to have actually considered the evidence229 and that defendant's lawyers
were denied adequate preparation time.
Although the terrorist insurrection has now been contained, the Peruvian
government continues to rely on the military to restore order. On May 23,
1998, the government of Peru issued the first of a series of decrees changing
the criminal law of Peru in order to confront the rapidly rising crime rate.23°
These changes included the expansion of military tribunals and the restriction,
and sometimes abrogation, of the right of habeas corpus.
Article 173 of the 1993 Constitution states that civilians will not be subject
to military tribunals except in the case of terrorist activity as determined by the
law.2al President Fujimori, however, gave these military tribunals jurisdiction
over civilians accused of non-terrorist crimes. He circumscribed the
constitution's clear prohibition of this act by redefining the word terrorist.
225 See id.
226 See id. at 592.
227 It is always important to keep in mind that for most of the 1980s and into the 1990s, the
Peruvian government was attempting to contain a very powerful and deadly terrorist force, the
Shining Path. Terrorist activity accounted for at least twenty-three thousand reported deaths as
well as ten billion dollars in damages to the country's infrastructure. Palmer, supra note 1, at
250. To put those numbers in perspective, the damage done by terrorists equaled eighty percent
of Peru's external debt and "six times more than its annual, legal exports." Strong, supra note
173, at 217.
22 See HAMMERGREN, supra note 213, at 90. Along with faceless judges, these tribunals
also use anonymous witnesses. Id. at 120.
229 See id. at 120.
230 Ley de Terrorismo Agravado No Garantiza Debido Proceso, EL COMERCIO (published
May 24, 1998) <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/4/1998/5/25/terrogra.txt.
html>.
231 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 173.
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The new laws defined aggravated terrorism as "illicit acts against the body,
life and health, against liberty, against property and the public safety
committed through criminal organization." '232 The redefining of the word
terrorism and the increased jurisdiction ofmilitary tribunals received criticism
from various sectors. One commentator noted that terrorism is an act against
the state with the intent of creating unrest throughout the country.233 Enrique
Chirinos Soto, president of the Constitutional Commission, noted that these
measures were unconstitutional because they did not conform to the parame-
ters set out in the 1993 Constitution.234 Another member of Congress sharply
disagreed with the policies of the government that allowed civilians, even
delinquents, to be tried by military tribunals. "In military courts," he said,
"civilians have fewer guarantees, the sentence cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court and all of the timetables are shorter." 235 Ultimately, these acts
lead away from a democratic nation and toward a militarized country.
Constitutionalist Raul Ferrero Cost voiced his concerns that the government
was on the road to the militarization of the country. No matter how horrible
the crime wave, he noted, the acts are within the jurisdiction of civilian courts
and should be dealt with by these courts.
236
Another area of concern is the right guaranteed by article 2(24)(f) of the
1993 Constitution. This article states:
Every person has the right to: liberty and personal safety. In
consequence: No one can be detained except through written
order from a judge or from the police authorities in cases of
flagrant acts. The detained should be put at the disposition of
the corresponding judiciary in a twenty-four hour time
span... This timetable does not apply to cases of terrorism,
spying and illicit drug trafficking. 37
232 Necesarias Correcciones, EL COMERCIO (published June 8, 1998) <http://www.
elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/6/1998/6/8/edito.txt.html>.
233 See id.
234 SeePreocupaci6n Compartieron Representantes del Congreso, ELCOMERCIO(published
May 22,1998) <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/4/1998/5/22/ 8leyes.txt.html>.
235 id.
236 See Figura de Terrorismo Agravado Conduce a Militarizaci6n del Pais, EL COMERCIO
(published May 22, 1998) <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/webcomercio/4/1998/5/22/
3leyes.txt.html>.
237 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 2(24)(f).
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The new laws allow those suspected of aggravated terrorism to be held for
fifteen days without the right to a lawyer. 38 Under the 1993 Constitution, this
would be a violation of a person's liberties. The government once again
avoided conflict by simply redefining the word terrorism, thereby making the
law technically legitimate.
Interestingly, in studying the Peruvian judicial reform, recurring issues
surface, such as the stability of constitutional reform as well as the leaders'
commitment to democracy. Illegitimate reform, even though for a good cause,
eventually weakens democracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stability in these four areas-constitutional reform, democratically elected
leaders, democratic elections, and judicial reform-are by no means exclusive.
However, they do shed important light on the state of democracy in Latin
America. In comparing the different countries, the struggle between
democracy and authoritarianism becomes clearer. And while some countries
are advancing more quickly toward democracy, all Latin American countries
evince the possibility of completely embracing and flourishing under a
democratic government. After reporting on the recent coup in Ecuador, one
writer aptly summed up the situation: "[O]nly the naive ever thought
democracy would effortlessly flourish in countries that are still mostly poor
and unequal. The good news is that it is not about to wither.,
239
238 Necesarias Correcciones, supra note 232.
239 A Warning From Ecuador, supra note 49, at 24.
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